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Abstract Everett (1957a, b, 1973) relative-state formulation of quantum me-
chanics has often been taken to involve a metaphysical commitment to the
existence of many splitting worlds each containing physical copies of observers
and the objects they observe. While there was earlier talk of splitting worlds in
connection with Everett, this is largely due to DeWitt’s (Phys Today 23:30–35,
1970) popular presentation of the theory. While the thought of splitting worlds
or parallel universes has captured the popular imagination, Everett himself
favored the language of elements, branches, or relative states in describing his
theory. The result is that there is no mention of splitting worlds or parallel
universes in any of Everett’s published work. Everett, however, did write of
splitting observers and was willing to adopt the language of many worlds in
conversation with people who were themselves using such language. While
there is evidence that Everett was not entirely comfortable with talk of many
worlds, it does not seem to have mattered much to him what language one
used to describe pure wave mechanics. This was in part a result of Everett’s
empirical understanding of the cognitive status of his theory.
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1 Pure wave mechanics and the language of relative states
According to Bryce DeWitt’s (1970) popular presentation of Hugh Everett
III’s (1957a) relative-state formulation of pure wave mechanics, accepting
Everett’s theory involves accepting the physical existence of many split-
ting worlds containing physical copies of observers and the objects they
observe.1 Various versions this view, some significantly more subtle than
DeWitt’s initial and subsequent formulations, remain fashionable.2 Such
many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics are often interesting
in their own right, but they do not necessarily mesh well with Everett’s
own views.
While there is no single interpretation of Everett that fits well with all of
his published work, marginal notes, and correspondence, some features of his
project are clear. Everett’s commitment to pure wave mechanics, described us-
ing the language of relative states, and his commitment to the goal of showing
that this theory makes the same empirical predictions as the standard collapse
theory remained constant throughout both his published and unpublished
work. Moreover, he had much to say concerning both how he understood pure
wave mechanics and how he understood physical theories generally. Together
this evidence explains both why it is unlikely that Everett would have taken his
theory to require or even to support the metaphysical reality of many worlds,
and why it is unlikely that he would have cared much what language people
used to describe his theory.
Pure wave mechanics, the theory Everett consistently championed, was
for him simply the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum
mechanics without the collapse dynamics. In order to resolve the quantum
measurement problem encountered by the standard collapse formulation,
Everett proposed taking pure wave mechanics to be a complete physical
1DeWitt was the first to present Everett’s theory in print as involving a metaphysical commitment
to many worlds. There are at least two earlier mentions of worlds in connection with Everett. In the
earliest, at a conference on quantum gravity organized by John Wheeler in January 1957, Cecile
DeWitt reports that Richard Feynman said that “the concept of a ‘universal wave function’ has
serious difficulties” and that “this is so since the function must contain amplitudes for all possible
worlds depending upon all quantum mechanical possibilities in the past and thus one is forced
to believe in the equal reality of an infinity of possible worlds” (DeWitt 1957). While this is not
reported as a direct quotation, it is likely a close representation of Feynman’s position at the time.
The second was at the Xavier conference on the conceptual foundation of quantum mechanics
discussed below.
2See Byrne (2010) for a presentation of the popular many-worlds view of Everett. See Saunders
et al. (2010), and especially Wallace (2010, 2011), for discussions of recent decoherence formula-
tions of many-worlds interpretations. Rather than postulate worlds as metaphysically basic, the
Saunders-Wallace emergent-world interpretation of Everett takes the quantum state to be all
that there is. Worlds are emergent, but real, physical entities. We will return to this idea below.
In contrast, see Osnaghi et al. (2009) for a close historical reading of Everett’s relative-state
formulation as a challenge to the Copenhagen orthodoxy.
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theory.3 His goal was to “deduce the probabilistic assertions of Process 1
as subjective appearances . . . thus placing the theory in correspondence with
experience. We are then led to the novel situation in which the formal theory
is objectively continuous and causal, while subjectively discontinuous and
probabilistic” (1973, 9).
Everett’s deductive strategy was to find a representation of our quantum
mechanical experience in the correlation model described by pure wave
mechanics. The first step in finding a representation of our experience was
to model ideal observers in the theory. If an ideal observer M begins in a
ready-to-make-a-measurement state and measures the observable O of system








Hence, the linearity of the dynamics in pure wave mechanics “has the far
reaching implication that for any possible measurement, for which the ini-
tial system state is not an eigenstate, the resulting state of the composite
system leads to no definite system state nor any definite apparatus state”
(1973, 60).
Everett distinguished between absolute and relative states. The interpreta-
tion of absolute states was given by the standard eigenvalue-eigenstate link.
This is why there is no definite system or apparatus state for any proper part of
the composite subsystem described by the entangled postmeasurement above.
Both the system and apparatus, however, do possess fully determinate relative
states.
One can arbitrarily choose a state for one subsystem, and be led to the
relative state for the remainder. Thus we are faced with a fundamental
relativity of states, which is implied by the formalism of composite sys-
tems. It is meaningless to ask the absolute state of a subsystem—one
can only ask the state relative to a given state of the remainder of the
subsystem. (1957b, 317)
It is in relative states that Everett finds our actual quantum mechanical
experience.
Given the linearity of the dynamics
[i]t is then an inescapable consequence that after the interaction has
taken place there will not, generally, exist a single observer state. There
will, however, be a superposition of the composite system states, each
element of which contains a definite observer state and a definite relative
3See Albert (1992) and Barrett (1999, 2008) for a description of the measurement problem and for
an explanation of the sense in which this would immediately resolve the measurement problem as
faced by the standard collapse theory.
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object-system state. Furthermore, as we shall see, each of these relative
object-system states will be, approximately, the eigenstates of the ob-
servation corresponding to the value obtained by the observer which is
described by the same element of the superposition. Thus, each element
of the resulting superposition describes an observer who perceived a
definite and generally different result, and to whom it appears that
the object-system state has been transformed into the corresponding
eigenstate. In this sense the usual assertions of [the collapse of the state
on measurement] appear to hold on a subjective level to each observer
described by an element of the superposition. (1973, 10).
Particular experience, then, is explained by the fact that there is a decomposi-
tion of the universal state where one can find the particular experience of an
observer; more precisely, a particular determinate experience is explained by
there being a relative observer state that describes the observer as having the
particular experience and by this relative state of the observer being associated
with a corresponding relative state for the observed system.
It is clear that Everett proposed pure wave mechanics as a complete and
accurate physical theory and that he took relative states to explain experience.
The two perennial interpretational puzzles concern (1) how he understood
relative states, elements, or branches and (2) how he understood probability.
This paper concerns the first problem.
2 DeWitt’s splitting worlds
DeWitt believed that Everett meant for each term in a preferred decomposi-
tion of the absolute state to describe a metaphysically real copy of the physical
world. Indeed, DeWitt attributed this view to Everett, Everett’s thesis advisor
John Wheeler, and DeWitt’s graduate student R. Neill Graham. In his popular
presentation of the theory DeWitt (1970), consequently, called it the EWG
interpretation, and he presented the metaphysical commitment to splitting
worlds as its central feature.
DeWitt introduced the EWG metaphysical commitment to real, causally
closed worlds in the context of the Schrödinger’s cat thought experiment.
The animal [is] trapped in a room together with a Geiger counter and a
hammer, which, upon discharge of the counter, smashes a flask of prussic
acid. The counter contains a trace of radioactive material—just enough
that in 1 h there is a 50% chance one of the nuclei will decay and therefore
an equal chance the cat will be poisoned. At the end of the hour the total
wave function for the system will have a form in which the living cat and
the dead cat are mixed in equal portions. Schrodinger felt that the wave
mechanics that led to this paradox presented an unacceptable description
of reality. However, Everett, Wheeler and Graham’s interpretation of
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quantum mechanics pictures the cats as inhabiting two simultaneous,
noninteracting, but equally real worlds. (1970, 31)
DeWitt took this to follow from “the mathematical formalism of quantum
mechanics as it stands without adding anything to it.” More specifically,
DeWitt claimed that EWG had proven a metatheorem that the mathematical
formalism of pure wave mechanics interprets itself.
Without drawing on any external metaphysics or mathematics other than
the standard rules of logic, EWG are able, from these postulates, to prove
the following metatheorem: The mathematical formalism of the quantum
theory is capable of yielding its own interpretation. (1970, 33)
DeWitt gave Everett credit for the metatheorem, Wheeler credit for encour-
aging Everett, and R. Neill Graham credit for clarifying the metatheorem.
Everett believed that pure wave mechanics was capable of yielding its own
interpretation in that it allowed one to deduce the empirical predictions of
the standard collapse theory. The question here concerns exactly how this was
supposed to work. DeWitt thought that pure wave mechanics alone entailed
the existence of many splitting worlds and that these worlds then explained
why one should expect to the experiences predicted by the standard collapse
theory. The extent to which pure wave mechanics might be taken to provide
its own metaphysical interpretation, however, is subtle both historically and
conceptually.
Since, as a point of logic, purely mathematical postulates entail only purely
mathematical theorems, one cannot deduce any metaphysical commitments
whatsoever regarding the physical world from the mathematical formalism
of pure wave mechanics alone. Consequently, pure wave mechanics can only
entail the sort of metaphysical commitments that DeWitt envisioned if a
proper statement of the theory is already taken to involve interpretational
principles that go beyond the bare mathematical formalism. The right question
then is whether and to what extent pure wave mechanics might be taken to
provide its own interpretation by dint of interpretational principles that one
might properly understand as a natural part of the theory. That said, if DeWitt
meant to suggest that Everett had proven a metatheorem that pure wave
mechanics, even properly conceived, involves a commitment to the existence
of metaphysically real splitting worlds, then it is unclear what he could have
had in mind. On even a very broad understanding of what might count as such a
metatheorem, there is nothing answering to DeWitt’s description in either the
long or short versions of Everett’s thesis. Of course, that Everett never claimed
to have deduced the existence of splitting worlds from a version of pure wave
mechanics does not mean that it is impossible to do so. But whether and to
what extent such a deduction might be possible depends on what metaphysical
assumptions one takes to be properly included in a full statement of pure wave
mechanics.
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The emergent-world interpretation of Everett as characterized by Wallace
(2010) provides an example of what it would take to deduce worlds from a
version of pure wave mechanics and is, hence, worth a short digression.4 While
Wallace takes Everett’s theory to be pure wave mechanics, his understanding
of the theory involves significantly more than than just a statement of the
mathematical formalism.5 Pure wave mechanics, properly conceived, is taken
to postulate that at the most fundamental level “the quantum state is all
there is.” Further, the quantum state is to be thought of as physically real in
the same sense as a field might be taken as physically real in classical field
theory. Worlds on this view are to understood as emergent entities. More
specifically, worlds are “mutually dynamically isolated structures instantiated
within the quantum state, which are structurally and dynamically ‘quasiclas-
sical’ ” where the “existence of these ‘worlds’ is established by decoherence
theory” (2010, 69–70). The thought then is to identify worlds in terms of
approximate emergent substructures of the correlation structure exhibited
by the quantum state. Since the quantum state is physically real, worlds are
also physically real inasmuch as they are identified with structures of the
quantum state. It is in characterizing the emergence of worlds that the theory
does some of its own interpretation work, but telling the story of emergent
worlds here requires a prior commitment to an appropriate version of state
realism.
In contrast with DeWitt’s reading of Everett, then, Wallace does not
insist that one somehow gets the metaphysics of splitting worlds from the
mathematical formalism of pure wave mechanics alone. Rather, as one would
expect, in order to get worlds as physically real emergent entities, one must first
stipulate the more basic ontology from which they emerge. Here this means
adopting a version of quantum state realism where the universal wave function
represents the sort of physical entity whose decohering substructures might be
properly identified as physically real emergent worlds. Rather than deriving
this metaphysical commitment from the mathematical formalism, it is simply
assumed as a primitive postulate of the theory, properly conceived, that the
quantum state is all there is and that it is the sort of entity that might explain
the existence of physically real emergent worlds by exhibiting an appropriate
structure under the dynamics. The point here is that while it may be possible
to argue that pure wave mechanics somehow yields its own interpretation, this
would require a significantly richer understanding of the theory than one can
4While there are many people who hold some version of the emergent-world interpretation and
while something like this view goes back to at least Zurek (1991) and arguably to Gell-Mann and
Hartle (1990) and Zeh (1970). Simon Saunders and David Wallace have recently done much of
the conceptual work required to make sense of this approach.
5Wallace takes the emergent-world interpretation to be identical with pure wave mechanics
and consequently to involve no additions to the theory itself. One might better understand the
emergent-world interpretation as pure wave mechanics together with decoherence considerations
and a metaphysical interpretation of the theory in light of such considerations.
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have from the mathematical formalism alone, an understanding that already
involves significant interpretational commitments.6
After claiming that Everett had proven a metatheorem that the mathemat-
ical formalism of pure wave mechanics yields an interpretation of the theory
without drawing on external metaphysics, DeWitt reported that
[t]he obstacle to taking such a lofty view of things, of course, is that
it forces us to believe in the reality of all the simultaneous worlds
represented in the superposition [. . . ] in each of which the measurement
has yielded a different outcome. Nevertheless, this is precisely what
EWG would have us believe. According to them the real universe is
faithfully represented by a state vector similar to that [above] but of vastly
greater complexity. This universe is constantly splitting into a stupendous
number of branches, all resulting from the measurement like interactions
between its myriads of components. Moreover, every quantum transition
taking place on every star, in every galaxy, in every remote corner of the
universe is splitting our local world on earth into myriads of copies of
itself. (1970, 33)
And concerning this vast and nonlocal splitting of physical worlds, DeWitt
famously reflected that
I can recall vividly the shock I experienced on first encountering this
multiworld concept. The idea of 10100+ slightly imperfect copies of oneself
all constantly splitting into further copies, which ultimately become
unrecognizable, is not easy to reconcile with common sense. Here is
schizophrenia with a vengeance. . . . Here we must surely protest. We do
not split in two, let alone into 10100+! To this EWG reply: To the extent
that we can be regarded simply as automata and hence on a par with
6The historical question of how one might best reconstruct Everett’s own understanding of pure
wave mechanics and its interpretation is discussed to some extent below and in more detail in
Barrett (2010, 2011). There is good reason to suppose that (1) Everett’s understanding of pure
wave mechanics did not involve any metaphysical commitment to the physical existence of the
quantum state or to real splitting worlds, (2) it was important to Everett’s understanding of
branches that they might be individuated with respect to any basis whatsoever and that they
are never in principle dynamically isolated, and (3) Everett did not appeal to decoherence
considerations to individuate branches. The emergent-worlds interpretation is nevertheless worthy
of serious consideration on its own merits. Further, this relatively recent interpretation of Everett
does capture at least one centrally important aspect of his project: Everett sought to demonstrate
the empirical faithfulness of pure wave mechanics by showing that one could find records
corresponding to the usual statistical prediction of quantum mechanics in the correlation structure
characterized by the global quantum state. At some level of description, this is precisely what is
done in the Saunders-Wallace interpretation; it is just that Everett did not explicitly consider this
particular way of individuating quasiclassical substructures.
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ordinary measuring apparatuses, the laws of quantum mechanics do not
allow us to feel the splits. (1970, 33)7
And, on behalf of Everett, Wheeler, and Graham, DeWitt concluded:
Finally, the EWG interpretation of quantum mechanics has an important
contribution to make to the philosophy of science. By showing that
formalism alone is sufficient to generate interpretation, it has breathed
new life into the old idea of a direct correspondence between formalism
and reality. The reality implied here is admittedly bizarre. To anyone
who is awestruck by the vastness of the presently known universe, the
view from where Everett, Wheeler and Graham sit is truly impressive.
(1970, 35)
When DeWitt and Graham subsequently included both the long and short
versions of Everett’s thesis with their own work in the 1973 Princeton Univer-
sity Press anthology The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,
the language of worlds stuck to Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics.8 But while DeWitt’s understanding of the theory may have agreed with
that of Graham, there is good reason to suppose that it did not agree well with
either Wheeler’s or Everett’s understanding.9 For his part, Wheeler directly
attributed the many worlds interpretation of Everett to DeWitt.
Bryce DeWitt, my friend at Chapel Hill, chose to call the Everett inter-
pretation the “many worlds” interpretation, and DeWitt’s terminology
is now common among physicists (although I don’t like it). The idea
has entered into the general public consciousness through the idea of
“parallel universes.” Although I have coined catchy phrases myself to
try to make an idea memorable, in this case, I opted for a cautious,
conservative term. “Many worlds” and “parallel universes” were more
than I could swallow. (Wheeler and Ford 1998, 269–270)
7While 10100+ is a big number, DeWitt believed that there were only a finite number of worlds
because of the finite precision of our measurements (1971, 42). For his part, Everett took there to
be an uncountably infinite number of branches depending on the decomposition of the state one
considers. See Werner (1962).
8Everett (1973) is a slightly revised version of the original long version of Everett’s Ph.D. thesis
circulated in 1956. Everett (1957a) is the much shorter official version of his thesis as revised and
redacted by Everett and Wheeler to soften the direct attack on the Copenhagen interpretation.
This is the version that Everett defended. Everett (1957b), included in the DeWitt and Graham
(1973) anthology, is virtually identical to Everett (1957a). Each of these documents presents pure
wave mechanics in the language of relative states and tells essentially the same story. The main
difference is in the extent to which they criticize the quantum orthodoxy of the time.
9Everett’s disagreement with Graham concerned the measure of typicality appropriate for
branches. Graham’s intuitions concerning typicality were a result of his understanding, with
DeWitt, that Everett had in mind counting branches as worlds. As discussed below, Everett was
deeply frustrated by this misunderstanding.
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Wheeler preferred the more conservative “relative state” language for de-
scribing Everett’s theory, the language that Everett in fact used consistently
throughout both the long and short versions of his thesis. The choice of
language one used to describe Everett’s theory was not simply a matter of
convention for Wheeler. Wheeler believed that DeWitt’s popular many worlds
language represented an “oversimplified way” of understanding Everett’s
theory (1998, 269). As we shall see, Everett’s own views were indeed
rather more subtle than suggested by DeWitt’s popular presentation of the
theory.
3 Why Everett did not take pure wave mechanics to involve a metaphysical
commitment to worlds
While strong metaphysical commitments were central to DeWitt’s understand-
ing of Everett, Everett did not take his theory to require or even support any
special metaphysical commitments.
Everett had explained his understanding of the nature and purpose of
physical theories in a letter to DeWitt some years before DeWitt wrote his
popular presentation of the theory.
First, I must say a few words to clarify my conception of the nature
and purpose of physical theories in general. To me, any physical theory
is a logical construct (model), consisting of symbols and rules for their
manipulation, some of whose elements are associated with elements of
the perceived world. If this association is an isomorphism (or at least a
homomorphism) we can speak of the theory as correct, or as faithful.
The fundamental requirements of any theory are logical consistency
and correctness in this sense. . . . However, there is no reason why there
cannot be any number of different theories satisfying these requirements,
and further (somewhat arbitrary) criteria such as usefulness, simplicity,
comprehensiveness, pictorability, etc., must be resorted to in such cases.
There can be no question of which theory is “true” or “real”—the best
that one can do is reject those theories which are not isomorphic to sense
experience. (1957d)
In the second appendix to the long version of his thesis, Everett explains
further that taking a theory to be descriptive of the metaphysics of the world is
a methodological mistake.
[W]hen a theory is highly successful and becomes firmly established, the
model tends to become identified with “reality” itself, and the model
nature of the theory becomes obscured. The rise of classical physics offers
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an excellent example of this process. The constructs of classical physics
are just as much fictions of our own minds as those of any other theory
[. . . ] we simply have a great deal more confidence in them. It must be
deemed a mistake, therefore, to attribute any more “reality” here than
elsewhere. (1973, 134)
Everett notes further that
[o]nce we have granted that any physical theory is essentially only a
model for the world of experience, we must renounce all hope of finding
anything like “the correct theory.” There is nothing which prevents any
number of quite distinct models from being in correspondence with
experience (i.e., all “correct”). (1973, 134)
So while DeWitt took a strong metaphysical commitment to splitting worlds to
be central to understanding Everett’s theory, Everett believed that his theory
neither required nor supported any special metaphysical commitments. As
Everett explained in the long thesis, ‘the primary purpose of theoretical physics
is . . . to make useful models which serve for a time and are replaced as they are
outworn” (1973, 111).10
This does not mean, however, that Everett was only interested in the purely
positivistic virtues of his theory. While he held that one can only require that
that a physical theory be logically consistent and empirically faithful, he also
believed that there were various optional, but desirable, pragmatic virtues.11
Everett described this aspect of theory selection in terms of a sort of cost-
benefit analysis. Among the pragmatic virtues was pictorability, and there is
reason to believe that Everett took pure wave mechanics to have this virtue.12
The pictorability of a theory might be thought to involve a particularly detailed
intuitive understanding of the theory’s model.
10This is presumably why Everett consistently used scare quotes around language that might
be interpreted as involving metaphysical commitments. Everett took his view of theories to be
“very nearly identical” with the view held by the positivist Philipp Frank in the 1950’s (Everett
1957c). For his part, Frank identified agreement with observations as the primary virtue of physical
theories and allowed for secondary virtues such as simplicity; but since one never has perfect
agreement with observations nor perfect simplicity, Frank argued, our physical theories will be,
at best, in fair agreement with observations and of sufficient simplicity to be useable. Frank thus
concluded that “it is obvious that such a theory cannot be ‘the truth”’; rather, it is “an instrument
that serves toward some definite purpose . . . a tool that produces other tools according to a
practical scheme” (Frank 1954, 14). See Barrett (2010, 2011) for extended discussions of Everett’s
understanding of his project and the status of physical theories.
11See Barrett (2011) for a discussion of empirical faithfulness and other virtues in Everett and for
an argument that pure wave mechanics can in fact be taken as empirically faithful on Everett’s
arguments alone.
12Everett mentions pictorability in connection with pragmatic virtues like simplicity and compre-
hensiveness, which he clearly takes pure wave mechanics to have (1973, 136).
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Everett’s view concerning the proper cognitive status of his theory presents
a new interpretational question for understanding Everett’s project. While
Everett, on methodological grounds, clearly did not believe that pure wave
mechanics supported or required any special metaphysical commitments, one
might consider the extent to which he favored a model or picture of the theory
that involved features that are well-described using the language of many
worlds.
While Everett consistently used the language of relative states, elements,
and branches in describing the correlation structure of pure wave mechanics,
there is (1) significant evidence that he was also willing to describe the
correlation structure in terms of splitting observers, (2) some evidence that he
was willing to describe it in terms of many worlds, and (3) some evidence that
he took both of these sorts of description to be at least somewhat misleading
and hence ultimately preferred talking in terms of relative states. I will briefly
review this evidence, focussing on lesser known sources. Ultimately, largely
because of the metaphysical modesty he exhibits in his discussion of the proper
cognitive status of physical theories, I do not believe that it mattered much
to Everett what language one used to describe the correlation model charac-
terized by pure wave mechanics. That he did not take his theory to support
or to require any special metaphysical commitments helps to explain why it
has proven difficult to find a single, coherent metaphysical interpretation of
his formulation of quantum mechanics that meshes well with what he actually
said.
4 Evidence for and against Everett’s comfort in talking of splitting observers
and many worlds
While Everett never referred to many worlds or parallel universes in anything
he wrote for publication, references to splitting observers are common in his
notes and in early drafts of the long thesis, and at least some of the language
of splitting observers ends up in even the final version of the long thesis.
Everett’s early thesis notes include such artifacts as a remarkable analogy
between splitting observers and splitting amoebas. In a short paper that
Everett wrote for Wheeler to show that he was making progress on his thesis
Everett argues:
We have, then, a theory which is objectively causal and continuous, while
at the same time subjectively probabilistic and discontinuous. It can lay
claim to a certain completeness, since it applies to all systems, of whatever
size, and is still capable of explaining the appearance of the macroscopic
world. The price, however, is the abandonment of the concept of the
uniqueness of the observer, with its somewhat disconcerting philosoph-
ical implications.
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As an analogy one can imagine an intelligent amoeba with a good
memory. As time progresses the amoeba is constantly splitting, each time
the resulting amoebas having the same memories as the parent. Our
amoeba hence does not have a life line, but a life tree. The question of
the identity or non identity of two amoebas at a later time is somewhat
vague.
At any time we can consider two of them, and they will possess
common memories up to a point (common parent) after which they will
diverge according to their separate lives thereafter.
We can get a closer analogy if we were to take one of these intelligent
amoebas, erase his past memories, and render him unconscious while he
underwent fission, placing the two resulting amoebas in separate tanks,
and repeating this process for all succeeding generations, so that none of
them would be aware of their splitting. After a while we would have a
large number of individuals, sharing some memories with one another,
differing in others, each of which is completely unaware of his “other
selves” and under the impression that he is a unique individual. It would
be difficult indeed to convince such an amoeba of the true situation short
of actually confronting him with his “other selves”. The same is true if
one accepts the hypothesis of the universal wave function. Each time an
individual splits he is unaware of it, and any single individual is at all times
unaware of his “other selves” with which he has no interaction from the
time of splitting. (1956b)
At this point in Everett’s paper, Wheeler wrote in his marginal comments:
“This analogy seems to me quite capable of misleading readers in what is a
very subtle point. Suggest omission.” The analogy does not occur again.13
In another early draft document, Everett explains:
The essence of this theory is the abandonment of the concept of the
uniqueness of observers, i.e. that there are individual entities, machines,
people, etc., which remain single unique individuals throughout periods
of time. In this theory when measurements (or in general any observa-
tions) are made on systems by “observers” (by which we mean merely
other systems) the observer itself splits into a number of observers, each
of which sees a definite result for the state of the system.
13In an early handwritten document, Everett lists a number of possible thesis titles including
“quantum mechanics in a world of independent observers,” “inclusion of all observers into
the machinery of quantum mechanics,” and “the multi-observer form of quantum mechanics,”
(1956a). While Everett was clearly willing to talk about splitting observers, there is good reason to
suppose that this is not what he had in mind here. Rather, as Everett explained in his discussion
of the quantum measurement problem in the long thesis, unlike the standard von Neumann-Dirac
and the Copenhagen formulations, his formulation of quantum mechanics provided a consistent
framework in which more than one observer could be physically modeled.
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Now, all of this, which is seemingly quite farfetched and contrary to
our experience, is actually implied if one takes seriously the formalism of
wave mechanics [without the collapse dynamics] and we shall even see
that we can recover [the collapse dynamics] from this picture as a tool of
practical expediency, not as a basic hypothesis. (1956c)
These two paragraphs, however, are crossed out with a note, apparently in
Everett’s hand, to omit them. While this way of characterizing the essence of
the theory does not occur again, the language of splitting observers does make
its way into the long thesis.
When discussing reversibility and irreversibility in the long thesis Everett
says:
. . . in observation processes the state of the observer is transformed into
a superposition of observer states, each element of which describes an
observer who is irrevocably cut off from the remaining elements. . . . As
soon as the observation is performed, the composite state is split into a
superposition for which each element describes a different object-system
state and an observer with (different) knowledge of it. (1973, 98)
In a particularly careful description of how to understand measurement in the
long thesis, however, Everett characterizes the split in terms of states splitting
rather than physical observers splitting.
We note that there is no longer any independent system state or observer
state, although the two have become correlated in a one-one manner.
However, in each element of the superposition (2.3), φiψ Oi[...,αi], the object-
system state is a particular eigenstate of the observer, and furthermore the
observer-system state describes the observer as def initely perceiving that
particular system state. It is this correlation which allows one to maintain
the interpretation that a measurement has been performed. (1973, 68)
And he then adds in a footnote:
At this point we encounter a language difficulty. Whereas before the ob-
servation we had a single observer state afterwards there were a number
of different states for the observer, all occurring in a superposition. Each
of these separate states is a state for an observer, so that we can speak of
the different observers described by the different states. On the other
hand, the same physical system is involved, and from this viewpoint it
is the same observer, which is in different states for different elements
of the superposition (i.e., has had different experiences in the separate
elements of the superposition). In this situation we shall use the singular
when we wish to emphasize that a single physical system is involved, and
the plural when we wish to emphasize the different experiences for the
separate elements of the superposition. (e.g., “The observer performs an
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observation of the quantity A, after which each of the observers of the
resulting superposition has perceived an eigenvalue.”) (1973, 68).
The suggestion seems to be that there is always precisely one physical ob-
server for whom multiple post-measurement relative states, each characterizing
different relative experiences, fully obtain. One way to understand this is in
terms of a branch indexical akin to time: just as a single physical system
might have different states at different times, a single physical system might
have different states at different branches; or, more carefully, different states
relative to different specifications of the state of any other correlated system.14
On this understanding, a careful description the measurement process involves
a single physical observer possessing multiple relative states.
More generally, it is significant that Everett takes the problem here to be
one of what language one should use to describe the correlation structure
characterized by pure wave mechanics. Describing the relationship between
the long and the short theses, Everett reports on the title page of the short
thesis that “[a]n earlier less condensed draft of the present work, dated January
1956, was circulated to several physicists. Their comments were helpful in
the most difficult task of finding the right words to attach to the individual
constructs of the present rather straightforward mathematical machinery”
(1957a). That Everett understood the problem as one of choosing the best
language to describe the mathematical structure of the theory meshes well with
his methodological empiricism.
5 Early worlds
While Everett did not refer to many worlds or parallel universes anywhere
in either version of his thesis, or even in his thesis notes or drafts, Everett’s
formulation of quantum mechanics was presented as a theory of parallel uni-
verses well before DeWitt’s popular presentation of the theory. The discussion
14The analogy between temporal and branch indexicality, between a system at different times
and a system at different branches, has been developed in some detail by Saunders (1995, 1996,
1998). See also Barrett (1999). A similar approach where physical states are understood in a
purely relationally way has been recently investigated by Conroy (2010). On such interpretations
of pure wave mechanics, there is precisely one quantum-mechanical world, but that world
has an essentially relational structure given by the correlations that determine relative states.
Property attribution to physical systems, including the attribution of having recorded a particular
measurement record, then is fundamentally relational. There is a similar analogy, though perhaps
less apt than the analogy with time, between special relativity and pure wave mechanics that is
suggested by the language of relative states: just as the appearance of a physical system is relative to
one’s choice of an inertial frame in special relativity, the state of a physical system is relative to the
specification of a state for a correlated system in pure wave mechanics. It is worth noting, however,
that Everett clearly takes this to be an issue of linguistic convention not one of metaphysics.
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at the 1962 conference on the foundations of quantum mechanics at Xavier
University provides an early example of such talk involving Everett himself.
When Everett’s theory was first mentioned at the Xavier conference, Boris
Podolsky commented “Oh yes, I remember now what it is about—it’s a
picture about parallel times, parallel universes, and each time one gets a
given result he chooses which one of the universes he belongs to, but the
other universes continue to exist” (Werner 1962, Monday AM 13). After a
preliminary discussion of the theory, the participants decided that they should
hear from Everett himself, so he was invited to fly to Cincinnati in order to join
the conference the next day. When he had the chance to present his theory,
Everett explained it as follows:
The picture I have is something like this: Imagine an observer making
a sequence of observations on a number of, let’s say, originally identical
object systems. At the end of this sequence there is a large superposition
of states, each element of which contains the observer as having recorded
a particular definite sequence of results of observation. I identify a single
element as what we think of as an experience, but still hold that it is
tenable to assert that all of the elements simultaneously coexist. In any
single element of the final superposition after all these measurements,
you have a state which describes the observer as having observed a quite
definite and apparently random sequence of events. Of course, it’s a
different sequence of events in each element of the superposition. In fact,
if one takes a very large series of experiments, in a certain sense one can
assert that for almost all of the elements of the final superposition the
frequencies of the results of measurements will be in accord with what
one predicts from the ordinary picture of quantum mechanics. That is
very briefly it. (Werner 1962, Tuesday AM, 18)
Podolsky then suggested that Everett change his descriptive language.
Perhaps it might be a little clearer to most people if you put it in a
different way. Somehow or other we have here the parallel times or
parallel worlds that science fiction likes to talk about so much. (Werner
1962, Tuesday AM, 19)
To which Everett replied:
Yes, it’s a consequence of the superposition principle that each separate
element of the superposition will obey the same laws independent of
the presence or absence of one another. Hence, why insist on having a
certain selection of one of the elements as being real and all of the others
somehow mysteriously vanishing. (Werner 1962, Tuesday AM, 19)
Later in the exchange Podolsky said “It looks like we would have a non-
denumerable infinity of worlds” and Everett replied “Yes” (Werner 1962,
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Tuesday AM, 20). When Abner Shimony asked whether Everett associated
awareness with each term in the superposition, Everett replied “Each individ-
ual branch looks like a perfectly respectable world where definite things have
happened” (Werner 1962, Tuesday AM, 22). By conference policy Everett had
the chance to revise the transcription of his own comments and, while he made
several minor changes, he kept his use of the term world in this last comment.
In addition to introducing Everett to a popular audience, DeWitt’s (1970)
popular presentation of the many-worlds interpretation helped to generate
considerable academic interest in Everett’s theory. It is significant that there
is no record of Everett ever publicly objecting to DeWitt’s presentation
of his theory. Moreover, Everett remained willing to use the language of
worlds in conversation with people who preferred such language. That said,
when Everett revised his long thesis for publication in the DeWitt-Graham
anthology, while he made a number of changes, he kept his original language of
relative states throughout. Further, Everett’s private correspondence indicates
that he was not entirely comfortable with DeWitt’s formulation of his theory
and the associated language of worlds.
In the Spring of 1977, Wheeler and DeWitt invited Everett to visit the
University of Texas, Austin to give a talk on his interpretation of quantum
mechanics. After the talk, David Deutsch, then a graduate student studying
quantum gravity with Wheeler and DeWitt, had a conversation with Everett
over lunch. DeWitt had introduced Deutsch to Everett’s theory, and Deutsch
took advantage of the chance to ask Everett about many universes. In an
interview with the journalist Peter Byrne, Deutsch recalls Everett as being
“very enthusiastic about many universes, and very robust as well as subtle
in its defense, and he did not speak in terms of ‘relative states’ or any
other euphemism” (Byrne 2010, 321–2). Deutsch has since become one of
the strongest proponents of what he calls the multiverse theory, a version
of DeWitt’s splitting worlds interpretation of Everett. Indicating his degree
of support for the theory, Deutsch claims that “[t]he fruitfulness of the
multiverse theory in contributing to the solution of long-standing philosophical
problems is so great that it would be worth adopting even if there were no
physical evidence for it at all” (1997, 339).15
In private correspondence, Everett was explicitly asked about DeWitt’s
presentation of his theory on at least two occasions. This was, of course, a
natural thing to ask about given the manifest differences between Everett’s
and DeWitt’s presentations of the theory.
15As evidence for this claim, Deutsch reports that “[i]ndeed, the philosopher David Lewis, in his
book On the Plurality of Worlds, has postulated the existence of a multiverse for philosophical
reasons alone” (1997, 329–340). The worlds of Deutsch’s quantum multiverse are, however,
entirely unsuitable as a model for Lewis’ modal realism. See Skyrms (1976) for an early discussion
of this point.
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In June 1977 William Harvey, associated with the Science Studies Unit at
the University of Edinburgh, wrote Everett:
The theory which you proposed in 1957 has now received widespread
attention, although for ten years it was, to quote Professor Jammer, ‘one
of the best kept secrets in this century.’ However, there are certain aspects
of the revival of this fascinating theory which interest me as a historian of
science. . . . Bryce DeWitt played a major part in the revival. Did he make
contact with you, e.g. to ask your permission to publish the book he edited
with Graham? After all, you had a prior claim on this theory. Do you
approve of the way DeWitt presented your theory? (Harvey 1977)
Everett replied by describing the process that led to his paper being published
in the DeWitt-Graham anthology; he then concludes “. . . I certainly approve of
the way Bryce DeWitt presented my theory, since without his efforts it would
never have been presented at all” (1977a).
In August of the same year, Everett was asked by the physicist Jean-
Marc Levy-Leblond for comments on a paper.16 Lévy-Leblond’s philosophical
paper was original, free-wheeling, but also well-argued for the time. In it he
considered the conceptual structure of the quantum measurement problem,
the Copenhagen interpretation, and finally Everett’s formulation of quantum
mechanics. Concerning Everett, the two main conclusions of the paper are
(1) Everett believed that the central problem with the Copenhagen inter-
pretation is that it relies too much on classical intuition and thus sacrifices a
quantum understanding of the measurement process and (2) DeWitt’s many-
world interpretation distorts Everett’s theory by imposing classical worlds on
the theory and hence making the same mistake as the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion.17 Lévy-Leblond argues that there has been a “serious misunderstanding
of Everett’s thesis by many of his followers.” Describing the labors of Everett’s
propagandists:
Once more, under a question of terminology lies a deep conceptual
problem. [Everett’s] interpretation in effect has been called by several
people, especially DeWitt, one of his main propagandists, the “many-
worlds (or many-universes) interpretation of quantum theory.” The re-
jection of the postulate projection [sic] leaves us with the “universal”
state vector. Since, with each successive measurement, this state-vector
“splits” into a superposition of several “branches”, it is said to describe
“many universes,” one for each of these branches. Where the Copen-
hagen interpretation would arbitrarily choose “one world” by cutting
off all “branches” of the state-vector except one (presumably the one
16The date on Lévy-Leblond’s letter is 17 August 1978, but it is likely that he got this wrong as
Everett has the date of his reply as 15 November 1977.
17The first point in fact meshes well with Everett’s main argument against the Copenhagen
interpretation both in his thesis and in earlier correspondence.
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we think we sit upon), one should accept the simultaneous existence
of the “many worlds” corresponding to all possible outcomes of the
measurement. Now, my criticism here is exactly symmetrical of the one
I directed again the orthodox position: the “many worlds” idea again
is a left-over of classical conceptions. The coexisting branches here, as
the unique surviving one in the Copenhagen point of view, can only
be related to “worlds” described by classical physics. The difference
is that, instead of interpreting the quantum “plus” as a classical “or”,
DeWitt and al. interpret it as a classical “and”. To me, the deep meaning
of Everett’s ideas is not the coexistence of many worlds, but on the
contrary, the existence of a single quantum one. The main drawback
of the “many-worlds” terminology is that it leads one to ask the ques-
tion of “what branch we are on,” since it certainly looks as if our
consciousness definitely belonged to only one world at a time: But this
question only makes sense from a classical point of view, once more.
(1976, 184–5).
Lévy-Leblond then asked Everett whether he got it right that there are no
splitting worlds.
I directly ask your opinion on what I take to be a crucial question
concerning the “Everett and no-longer-Wheeler” (if I understand cor-
rectly!) interpretation of [quantum mechanics]. The question is one of
terminology: to my opinion there is but a single (quantum) world, with its
universal wave function. There are not “many worlds,” no “branching.”
etc. except as an artifact of insisting once more on a classical picture of
the world. (Lévy-Leblond 1978)
In reply, Everett reported that he very much liked the paper, he agreed
with Lévy-Leblond’s analysis of the relationship between his work and
DeWitt’s, and he denied that the many worlds terminology was his. Everett
wrote:
The reason for the delay in acknowledging receipt of your pre-print,
“Toward a Proper Quantum Theory,” is that it is one of the more
meaningful papers I have seen on this subject, and therefore deserving of
a reply. This is always a mistake for me to make, as I very rarely complete
a thorough review of papers, despite all good intentions. In this case, your
observations seem entirely accurate (as far as I have read.) I especially
enjoyed your inspired conclusion, pp. 192–4.18
I have not done further work in this area since the original paper
in 1955. (not published in its entirety until 1973, as the “Many-Worlds
Interpretation etc.”). This, of course, was not my title as I was pleased to
18The inspired conclusion is Lévy-Leblond’s “zipperdynamics” spoof of explanation in the Copen-
hagen tradition.
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have the paper published in any form anyone chose to do it in! I, in effect,
had washed my hands of the whole affair in 1956. (1977b)
In a draft of the same letter, Everett said more about how he understood
his relationship to DeWitt. Referring to DeWitt’s energetic promotion of his
work, Everett had it this way:
[T]he “Many-Worlds Interpretation etc.” . . . is not my title as I was
pleased to have the paper published in any form anyone chose to do it in!
I, in effect, had washed my hands of the whole affair in 1955. Far be it for
me to look a gift Boswellian writer in the mouth! But your observations
are entirely accurate (as far as I have read). (1977b draft)19
In agreeing with Lévy-Leblond, Everett is agreeing that the notion of many
worlds relies on a mistaken classical crutch and that his own formulation of
quantum mechanics is best understood in terms of a single quantum world.20
What Everett says in his draft letter also fits well with his report to Harvey
that he had no objection to DeWitt’s presentation of the theory since without
DeWitt the theory would never have been presented at all. As Everett was
not gifted at self promotion, his debt to DeWitt’s Boswellian efforts was
significant and he knew it.21 But he was also clearly not entirely comfortable
with DeWitt’s many worlds.
Everett’s mentions “the world view” one last time in a letter to a physics
enthusiast, L. David Raub, in 1980, two years before Everett’s death. Everett
begins his reply to Raub by stating that he still supports all of the conclusions
of his thesis and believes that his approach remains the only entirely consistent
interpretation of quantum mechanics that explains both the content of the
theory and appearances. Explaining why some do not like his theory, Everett
says, “It is abhorrent to many individuals that there should not be a single
unique state for them (in the world view), even though my interpretation
explains all subjective feelings quite adequately and is consistent with all
observations” (1980). Here Everett uses both the relative state terminology
of his thesis and mentions the world view. As usual, Everett suggests that what
should ultimately matter is that his view is logically consistent and consistent
with our observations.
19Concerning how far Everett read, he clearly read the section involving his own formulation of
quantum mechanics and DeWitt’s interpretation of it as a many worlds theory as he explicitly
responded to material in this section. Everett’s notes on his copy of the paper and what he says in
his letter indicate that he also closely read at least the conclusion and the zipperdynamics sections.
The earlier date in the draft letter is Everett’s.
20Presumably, a single quantum world where the physical objects typically possess only relative
states.
21James Boswell (1740–1795) chronicled the life and views of his friend Samuel Johnson in such a
compelling way that he virtually guaranteed Johnson’s enduring fame. His biography of Johnson
is also famous for taking liberties with the details of Johnson’s life for the purpose of engaging
narrative.
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6 The tension between metaphysically distinct worlds and pure wave
mechanics, and the sense in which all branches are equally real for Everett
DeWitt identified branches with metaphysically real copies of the physical
worlds because this provided an immediate and compelling explanation for the
existence of determinate measurement records. When a measurement occurs,
the world splits, creating physical copies of the observer. Each physical copy
gets a different but fully determinate measurement record that corresponds
to the determinate properties of the physical objects in his world. But there is
also significant tension between talk of physically splitting worlds and Everett’s
understanding of pure wave mechanics. One of the conflicts arises from how
Everett understood the elements or branches of a superposition.
While Everett was metaphysically modest on methodological grounds,
he took elements or branches to be equally real or actual both from the
perspective of pure wave mechanics and in a more robust empirical sense.
Everett repeatedly made the point that all branches are equally real from the
perspective of the theory in that pure wave mechanics treats them in precisely
the same way: both in his thesis and in his 1957 letter to DeWitt, for example,
Everett reported that “[f]rom the viewpoint of the theory, all elements of a
superposition (all ‘branches’) are ‘actual,’ none any more ‘real’ than another”
(1957d). The argument, as Everett explained in his Xavier comments and
elsewhere, was that since there is nothing in the theory that picks one term in
the superposition as in any sense special (the fundamental relativity of states)
and since, by the linearity of the dynamics, each element of the superposition
obeys the same dynamical laws independent of the presence or absence of
any another, the theory itself does nothing whatsoever to indicate that any
particular element or branch is or need be descriptively privileged (Werner
1962, Tuesday AM, 19). But Everett also understood branches to be real in
a more robust empirical sense. Specifically, because of the linearity of the
dynamics,
[i]t is therefore improper to attribute any less validity or “reality” to any
element of a superposition than any other element, due to [the] ever
present possibility of obtaining interference effects between the elements.
All elements of a superposition must be regarded as simultaneously
existing. (1973, 107)
That branches were real for Everett insofar as they might always have direct
empirical consequences provides a more subtle and complete understanding
of how Everett thought of branches, but it also suggests a tension between
Everett’s branches and DeWitt’s worlds. DeWitt’s conception of simultaneous,
noninteracting, but equally real worlds, is not only incompatible with pure
wave mechanics but it undermines Everett’s positive argument for the em-
pirical reality of branches. Further, inasmuch as both Everett’s understanding
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of branches and pure wave mechanics itself require that there always be
the possibility of interference between branches, branches are not so clearly
worldlike.22
Another difficulty in taking branches to be worlds in pure wave mechanics
is that, in his principle of the fundamental relativity of states, Everett explicitly
denies that that there is any physically preferred way in pure wave mechanics
to decompose the absolute state of a physical system. Rather, one arbitrarily
chooses a subsystem of the composite system and arbitrarily chooses a state for
that subsystem, then the theory determines a relative state for the complement
system (1957b, 317; 1973, 43). There is hence no physically preferred way to
individuate branches, and hence no physically preferred way to individuate
worlds insofar as branches are understood as worlds.
In his marginal notes on a copy of the paper, Everett replies to John
Bell’s (1971) discussion concerning the temporal directionality of branching by
insisting that the process of “branching [is] only relative to choice of basis—can
make [temporal directionality of branching] either way!” (Everett’s marginal
notes on Bell 1971, 16). The thought is that since pure wave mechanics
indicates no preferred basis, whatever one says about the branching process
is relative to a choice of basis. Of course, insofar as branching is relative to a
choice of basis, if one insists on associating branches with worlds then, what
worlds there are is relative to a choice of basis. But if there is no canonical way
22While Everett required that branches always be capable of interference, he also recognized that,
insofar as the evolution of the absolute state was linear, one could think of each branch as evolving
on its own subject to the same dynamical laws, then get the resulting absolute state by superposing
the independent branch evolutions by appeal to what he referred to as the superposition principle.
On this view, branches might be thought of as causally independent exactly insofar as they do not
in fact interfere with each other. Had it been important to Everett that branches exhibit a strong
worldlike causal independence, he might have appealed to decoherence considerations to argue
that branches describing sufficiently complex systems or systems that strongly correlate to their
environments should never be expected to interfere. But he did not so argue in either version of
his thesis. Indeed, rather than appeal to decoherence considerations to argue that branches are
independent, Everett understood branches to be empirically real precisely because they always
might, at least in principle, interfere with each other. Further, Everett’s account of determinate
measurement records relied on the postmeasurement relative states of the observer and her
object system, and his account of the dynamical classicality of everyday systems relied on the low
dispersion of massive systems in both position and momentum, not decoherence considerations
(1973, 88–9 and 117–8; see also Barrett 2011). Given his view of worlds as causally independent,
it is curious that DeWitt also, at least sometimes, seems to have understood that branches must
be capable of interfering with each other and hence exhibiting unworldlike behavior: “We may,
in principle, restore the interference effects . . . by bringing the apparatus packets back together
again. But then the correlations between system and apparatus are destroyed, the apparatus
memory is wiped out and no measurement results” (1970, 35). See Albert and Barrett (1995) for
further discussion of why pure wave mechanics requires interactions between branches. Regarding
the emergent-worlds interpretation of Everett, there is nothing wrong with using decoherence
considerations to select some branches as corresponding to emergent worlds at a specified level
of description. Such emergent worlds, however, can only be thought of as more or less well-
individuated relative to the explanatory purpose at hand; put another way, not only are such
worlds emergent, but how many and what emergent worlds there are is contingent on the level
of description one adopts. This point is recognized in careful presentations of the view.
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to individuate worlds, then there are no canonical structures in the correlation
model to call worlds. Of course, one could take every relative state to describe
the state of a system in some world, but then there would be a different full
set of equally actual worlds for every choice of basis. This would be a many-
many-worlds interpretation of the correlation model, which is presumably not
what DeWitt had in mind. Moreover, many of these worlds would be entirely
unworldlike insofar as they would routinely exhibit interference effects. Or one
might take various branches to be more or less worldlike for the explanatory
purpose at hand. This would be to take the precise metaphysical distinction
between different worlds to be largely a matter of convention.23
In the same paper Bell, for his part, noted the distinction between Everett
and DeWitt regarding how to divide the wave function into branches and
consequently on the existence of any physically preferred basis.
It is not clear to me that Everett and DeWitt conceive in the same
way the division of the wave function into ‘branches’. For DeWitt this
division seems to be rather definite, involving a specific (although not
very clearly specified) choice of variables (instrument readings) to have
definite values in each branch. This choice is in no way dictated by
the wave function itself (and it is only after it is made that the wave
function becomes a complete description of DeWitt’s physical reality).
Everett on the other hand (at least in some passages) seems to insist on
the significance of assigning an arbitrarily chosen state to an arbitrarily
chosen subsystem and evaluating the ‘relative state’ of the remainder.
(Bell 1971, 19)
In his personal copy of Bell’s paper, Everett put a check mark suggesting
agreement in the left margin next to the last sentence of this passage.24 In
agreeing with Bell, Everett would simply be reiterating the view expressed in
his earlier marginal notes on Bell’s paper and in both versions of his thesis that
the individuation of branches is arbitrary. The upshot, again, is that if one takes
branches to be worlds, then the individuation of worlds is arbitrary.
Finally, if branches are supposed to describe physical copies of worlds, then
one might naturally expect, as both DeWitt and Graham did, that something
would be a typical property of a world if it held for most worlds. Everett’s
measure of typicality, however, was entirely unrelated to the number of
DeWitt worlds. Moreover, Everett considered Graham’s proposal to associate
the typicality measure with the number of DeWitt worlds to be entirely
23I take this to be the strategy employed by the Saunders-Wallace emergent-world interpretation
of Everett.
24Everett typically marked disagreement with one or more question marks, often combined with
exclamation points and corrective comments. He disagreed with much of what Bell said in the
Everett(?) section of this paper, but not this point. It is unclear when Everett made his marginal
notes.
Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2011) 1:277–302 299
misguided.25 Rather, Everett explicitly wanted a standard of typicality that was
independent of how one chose to decompose the absolute universal state and
hence independent of the number of branches one might individuate.26
The point here is that for Everett branches of the absolute state were
always both conventional in their specification and empirically real in their
potential to exhibit interference phenomena. One might expect any many-
worlds formulation that is attributed to Everett to take into account this
understanding of branches.
7 Discussion
As Everett reported to Lévy-Leblond, the language of many worlds was not
his own. Even so, Everett was willing to use such language to describe the
correlation structure characterized by pure wave mechanics when prompted
to do so by Podolsky, DeWitt, and others. As a methodological empiricist,
however, Everett took such talk neither to support nor to require any special
metaphysical commitments. Rather, what mattered to Everett was the empiri-
cal faithfulness of pure wave mechanics, which for him involved showing how
one might find our actual experience represented in the correlation structure
described by the theory.
Everett took elements, branches, and relative states to be equally real
both (1) from the viewpoint of the theory in the weak sense that pure
wave mechanics did not distinguish between branches or between alternative
decompositions of the absolute state into branches and (2) in the more robust
empirical sense that pure wave mechanics required that branches always be in
principle observable by virtue of potential interference effects. In other words,
precisely what made branches real for Everett was their unworldlike potential
to exhibit interference phenomena.
In summary, then, while Everett clearly favored the language of relative
states and elements or branches in describing the correlation structure, he
did not care very much what language one used to describe the structure
characterized by pure wave mechanics. And while there is evidence that
25Graham thought that he was providing much needed “physical significance” to Everett’s mea-
sure of typicality by associating it with the numerical proportion of DeWitt worlds for which the
standard quantum statistics obtained (Graham 1970). In the margin of DeWitt’s (1971) working
paper where he explains how he and Graham have provided an improved understanding of the
physical significance of Everett’s measure of typicality, however, Everett writes “Goddam it” and
adds “You don’t see it.”
26Everett’s additivity requirement relates typicality measures under different decompositions of
the state (1973, 71–72). If there were any single physically preferred decomposition of the state
that individuated worlds, this requirement would be unmotivated. It is worth noting that Everett’s
additivity constraint on the typicality measure remains well-motivated on the Saunders-Wallace
interpretation precisely because there is no physical matter of fact about how many worlds there
are since the individuation of worlds is always contingent on the level of description one chooses.
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Everett was at least somewhat uncomfortable with DeWitt’s description of his
project and while he specifically makes a point of indicating that the talk of
many worlds is not his own, he was clearly grateful to DeWitt for promoting
his work.
Everett always maintained that his relative-state formulation of pure wave
mechanics was both complete and fully acceptable as he had described it in his
thesis. As he explained in the second appendix to the long version of the thesis,
Everett took pure wave mechanics to be acceptable because it was consistent
and empirical faithful, and it was superior to other consistent interpretations
of quantum mechanics because it was simpler and more comprehensive. Pure
wave mechanics as he presented it is indeed consistent, it is arguably simple,
and it is comprehensive in the sense that all physical systems are treated in
precisely the same linear way. That pure wave mechanics is empirically faithful,
however, is more subtle.
While a full account goes beyond the scope of the present paper, a physical
theory was empirically faithful for Everett if it provided a representation of
our actual experience within a substructure of the model characterized by the
theory. More specifically, Everett took pure wave mechanics to be empirically
faithful because (1) the values of our measurement records are represented as
relative records in the correlation structure characterized by the theory and
(2) there is a measure of typicality over relative measurement records that can
be determined from the correlation structure alone and that covaries with the
standard quantum expectations.27
Everett recognized that there was also excess structure represented by pure
wave mechanics insofar as it provided representations of both our actual
measurement records and measurement records that do not appear to us to
obtain, but this did not bother him since he simply required that one can be
able to find our actual experience in the model and that one to be able to
understand this experience as being appropriately typical. In this sense, then,
Everett explained both determinate measurement records and the standard
quantum statistics while avoiding the embarrassment of having to insist on a
particular metaphysical interpretation of branches.
On this view, the remaining question is whether pure wave mechanics
being empirically faithful in the sense described by Everett should be taken
as sufficient for the empirical acceptability of the theory. While Everett’s
standard of empirical acceptability is certainly weaker than one might want,
it is perhaps more than one might have thought one could get from pure wave
mechanics without any special metaphysical commitments. Further, one might
take the charitable view that the flexibility in the language that Everett used to
describe the correlation model of pure wave mechanics was warranted given
that he was metaphysically agnostic on epistemological grounds and that he
explicitly recognized that the ordinary descriptive language did not fit well
with the structure of relative states and branches in the theory. Indeed, insofar
27See Barrett (2010, 2011) for discussions of the empirical faithfulness of pure wave mechanics.
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as one insists on ordinary language explanations of experience in the context
of pure wave mechanics, one will be required to use ordinary language in
extraordinary ways.
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